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On the Very Idea of an Ideal Type1
Gerhard Wagner and Claudius Härpfer
The concept of ideal type plays an essential role in Max Weber’s social science. Unfortunately Weber 
failed to explain exactly what an ideal type really is. This question cannot be answered as long as the 
source of the concept is not identified. We will examine some possible sources and argue that the work of 
the physicist and physiologist Hermann von Helmholtz is the most plausible source. Our purpose is to 
show that a consideration of several key essays by Helmholtz shows what Weber meant with his concept 
of ideal type: namely the result of a specific kind of induction.
I.
In 1904 Max Weber published his essay “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in 
Social Science and Social Policy” on the occasion of assuming the editorship 
of the Archive for Social Science and Social Policy [Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik]. With his essay Weber wanted to shape the journal as an organ of 
a value-free social science as well as to put forward his own draft of a social 
science in which the concept of ideal type would play an essential role.
Weber introduced the concept of ideal type in his critique of Carl Menger’s 
so-called abstract theory of economics (Weber 2012: 123-124; 1949: 87-89; 
1982: 187-190).2 Although Menger had drawn a fundamental methodological 
distinction between nomological and historical knowledge, his theory pro-
ceeded along the lines of the exact natural sciences, in an attempt to deduce 
the multiplicity of social life from laws. By taking this course, Weber argued, 
Menger failed to grasp the definitive property of his own economic concepts: 
1  Thanks are due to Gary Hatfield, Tom Kaden, Kai Müller, Guy Oakes, Hubert Treiber and 
Angelika Zahn.
2  Unfortunately the available English translations of  Weber’s essay are not always precise 
enough to offer an adequate understanding of  Weber’s thought. For the sake of  convenience, 
we quote Weber (2012) and additionally mark Weber (1949) and the German original Weber 
(1982).
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a special case of a kind of concept formation that is distinctive, and to a cer-
tain extent indispensable, to the sciences of human culture.
According to Weber, the abstract theory of economics is “an example of 
those syntheses that are usually called ‘ideas’ of historical phenomena” (We-
ber 2012: 124; 1949: 89; 1982: 190). Such syntheses give us “an ideal image of 
what goes on in a market for goods when society is organized as an exchange 
economy, competition is free, and action is strictly rational” (Weber 2012: 124; 
1949: 89-90; 1982: 190). Such an ideal image is a “mental image”, because 
it “brings together certain relationships and events of historical life to form 
an internally consistent cosmos of imagined interrelations” (Weber 2012: 124; 
1949: 90; 1982: 190). Substantively, this construct has the character of an uto-
pia produced by the mental accentuation of certain elements of reality (Weber 
2012: 124; 1949: 90; 1982: 190). The relation of this utopia to the empirically 
given data consists solely in the fact that where hypothetical relationships of 
the kind referred to by the abstract construct are discovered or supposed to 
exist in reality, at least to some extent, “we can pragmatically clarify the dis-
tinctive character of that interrelation and make it understandable, by means of 
an ideal type” (Weber 2012: 124-125; 1949: 90; 1982: 190).
Like the “idea” of the historically given modern organisation of society as 
a market economy, we can, for example, by analogy to “exactly the same log-
ical principles” develop “the idea of the medieval ‘city economy’” by forming 
the concept “city economy” not as the “average” of the economic factors that 
actually exist in all the cities observed, but as an “ideal type” (Weber 2012: 125; 
1949: 90; 1982: 190-191). An ideal type is formed by means of “a one-sided 
accentuation of one or a number of viewpoints and through the synthesis of a great 
many diffuse and discrete individual phenomena (more present in one place, 
fewer in another, and occasionally completely absent), which are in conformi-
ty with those one-sided, accentuated viewpoints, into an internally consistent 
mental image” (Weber 2012: 125; 1949: 90; 1982: 191). In its conceptual purity, 
this “mental image” cannot be found anywhere in empirical reality. Thus 
historical research faces the task “of establishing, in each individual case, how 
close reality is to, or how distant it is from, that ideal image” (Weber 2012: 
125; 1949: 90; 1982: 191).
On the one hand, Weber emphasized that an ideal type is not a “schema” 
into which reality should be fitted as a “specimen”. Rather it “has the status of a 
purely ideal limiting concept against which reality is measured – with which it is 
compared” (Weber 2012: 127; 1949: 93; 1982: 194). Thus Weber differentiated 
the ideal type from the generic concepts of natural science, the conceptual 
model that the abstract theory of economics attempted to follow. On the oth-
er hand, Weber emphasized that an ideal type should not be identified with 
an “idea of what ought to be, of an ‘ideal’”, because it is “ideal” solely in “the 
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strictly logical sense of the term” (Weber 2012: 126; 1949: 91-92; 1982: 192). 
Weber emphasized this point because of his intent to establish a value-free 
social science.
Hence Weber tried hard to emphasize the purely logical meaning of his 
concept of ideal type. In accordance with his sharp distinction between prac-
tical value judgments, with which certain aspects of reality are assessed in 
the light of normative ideals, and theoretical value relations, in which certain 
aspects of reality are selected as objects of scientific research because of their 
cultural significance, the ideal of the ideal type was not a normative basis of 
judgements but only a logical standard of comparison: “relating reality to ide-
al types (in the logical sense of the word) by means of logical comparison” must 
be distinguished clearly from “ judging reality evaluatively on the basis of ide-
als”: “An ‘ideal type’ in our sense of the term is totally indifferent to evaluative 
judgments; it has nothing to do with any other ‘perfection’ than a purely logical 
one” (Weber 2012: 130; 1949: 98-99; 1982: 200).
For Weber this distinction seemed to be clear. However, the fact that he 
connected the concept of ideal type with the concept of idea calls to mind 
the Platonic idea and its normative and metaphysical implications. Weber 
insisted that he was not following Plato. His concept of idea doesn’t refer to “a 
‘true’ reality that exists beyond the fleeting phenomena”; accordingly he em-
phasized that an ideal type is certainly “not ‘true’ reality” (Weber 2012: 127; 
1949: 93-94; 1982: 194-195). However, he failed to explain exactly who the 
referent of his concept of idea is. This also holds true for his later publications. 
The result: endless controversy over the question what an ideal type really is 
– a discussion that has led nowhere.
This question cannot be answered as long as the source of the concept is 
not identified. In the following account, we will examine some possible sourc-
es and argue that the work of the physicist and physiologist Hermann Helm-
holtz (after 1883, Hermann von Helmholtz) is the most plausible source. Our 
purpose is to show that a consideration of several key essays by Helmholtz 
shows what Weber meant with his concept of ideal type: namely the result of 
a specific kind of induction.
II.
Weber was silent on the source of the concept of ideal type. This is all the 
more curious since “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and 
Social Policy” is a programmatic piece. It is precisely in this essay that the 
reader could expect references. However, in contrast to Weber’s other meth-
odological writings this essay contains no more than a few allusions and only 
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one footnote. In this footnote Weber noted that in “all important respects” 
his essay built on “the writings of modern logicians”: Wilhelm Windelband, 
Georg Simmel and, especially for his purposes, Heinrich Rickert (Weber 
2012: 100; 1949: 49-50; 1982: 146). This hint is misleading as regards the 
concept of ideal type, which does not appear, either explicitly or implicitly 
in Windelband’s or Simmel’s writings. Moreover, Rickert, whom Weber fol-
lowed in sundry ways (Wagner and Härpfer 2014), even seemed to be an ad-
versary of any concept of type.
In Rickert’s book The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, published 
in 1902, the concept of ideal type doesn’t occur literally. But there is a pas-
sage which can be interpreted in this respect (Rickert 1902: 360-363). Rickert 
discussed the concept of “type” and distinguished two meanings. On the one 
hand, this word refers to what is “characteristic for the average of a group of 
things or proceedings”. In that case, it means “at times something like speci-
men of a general generic concept”. On the other hand, it refers to “something 
like an exemplar or model”. However, these meanings can be identified only if 
one sees “in the content of a general concept a model or an ideal” to which the 
“single individuals” – conceived as the “imperfect copies of the general con-
cept” – orient themselves. This reasoning makes sense only on the “ground of 
a Platonic conceptual realism”, according to which “the general values” are 
“the true reality” in the sense of “the general reality”. This leads “adherents 
of a natural scientific universal methodology” to understand natural scientific 
concepts as “metaphysical realities”. Without these “metaphysical premises” 
the “typical as the average” must be distinguished from the “typical as the 
model”. This is because “the ‘typical’ manifestation of the content of a general 
concept” can never be “the ‘typical’ manifestation of an ideal”.
On the condition of a sharp distinction between both meanings, Rickert 
was willing to acknowledge that the conception of the typical as model is “not 
altogether mistaken when applied to some historical objects”. For example, if 
one claims that Goethe or Bismarck are “typical Germans”, this could mean 
“that in their singularity and individuality they are models, and because of 
this they must be relevant for all people, so that as types they become histor-
ical in-dividuals as well”. The typical as the average also comes into question 
with regard to “relative historical concepts”. However, even if a confusion of 
“relevance for all” with “in common with all” is avoided, the concept of type is 
in the last analysis “totally useless” for a “really comprehensive concept of the 
historical individual”. This is because “history is certainly not exclusively con-
cerned with objects that are types in the one sense of the word or in the other”.
As regards the ideal type, therefore, there is only a very limited sense in 
which it can be claimed that Weber began with Rickert: namely insofar as 
Rickert had shown that a type cannot be a metaphysically charged general 
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concept but nevertheless comes into question for the definition of a historical 
individual. This interpretation is confirmed by a letter Weber sent to Rickert 
shortly after the publication of “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social 
Science and Social Policy” (Weber 1904). It reveals that Rickert seems to have 
written Weber – in a letter that is unfortunately not extant – concerning his 
“agreement with the conception of the ‘ideal type’”, which he hardly would 
have done if this “conception” were his own. However, Rickert must have had 
scruples concerning the word ideal type. In any case, Weber answered that he 
considered a “similar category” necessary in order to be able to distinguish 
between practical “value judgements” and theoretical “value relations”. What 
one called this category was “relative inconsequential” to him. He used the 
term “ideal type” because “in colloquial language one speaks of an ‘ideal 
borderline case’, the ‘ideal purity’ of a typical event, and an ‘ideal construc-
tion’ etc., without implying that something ought to be the case. Further what 
Jellinek (Gen[eral] Theory of the State) called an ‘ideal type’ is perfect only 
in a logical sense, not in the sense of a model”. Weber noted that the category 
needed to be “further clarified”, because in his essay it still posed all sorts of 
“undifferentiated problems”. With his reference to Jellinek, Weber brought 
another author into play. Although Jellinek was not a modern logician, but a 
jurist, in his book General Theory of the State, published in 1900, the concept of 
ideal type appears literally.
Jellinek had distinguished between an “average type” and an “ideal type” ( Jel-
linek 1900: 32-33).3 According to him the concept of “ideal type” refers to the 
“perfect essence of a genus”. Either it is conceivable “in a Platonic manner as a 
transcendent idea which appears in individuals only in an imperfect way”; or 
it is conceivable “following Aristotle, as an effective and shaping power which 
designs the singular specimen of the genus”. In any case it has an “essentially 
teleological meaning”: It is “the τέλος of each thing and each human appear-
ance to give it an expression“. This type is “not something that exists, but 
something that ought to exist.” Therefore it is a “standard for judging what 
exists”: What is in accordance with it is “good” and has the “right” to exist. 
Otherwise it has to be rejected and superseded. “From Hellenic philosophy 
through the scholasticism of the Middle Ages until present,” this type has 
“continuously engaged the whole scientific thinking”. Concerning the theory 
of the state, in which Jellinek was especially interested, the conception of an 
ideal type leads to the attempt to “find the best state and measure the existing 
Governmental institutions against this type”. Accordingly, this type is either 
3  In German there are two words for “ideal type”, nameley “idealer Typus” and “Idealtypus”. 
Weber only used “Idealtypus”. Jellinek used both words synonymously.
SOCIETÀMUTAMENTOPOLITICA220
a “product of free speculation (as it occurs particularly in political novels)”; 
or “existing states or some of their institutions are reconstructed as an ideal 
type”. The value of such ideal types for political action may be immense; 
however, it is quite modest for “theoretical-scientific knowledge” whose object 
is “what exists” and not “what ought to exist” – the “given world”, not a “pro-
spective world that does not exist”.
Jellinek’s ideal type is a case of exactly that identification of general generic 
concepts with normative perfection whose metaphysical premises Rickert not-
ed in 1902. Weber certainly did not follow this interpretation. The only point 
of contact could have been the formal mode of construction which Jellinek 
had found in the speculations and reconstructions of theories of the state. In 
any case, as his letter to Rickert shows, Weber must have seen the possibility 
of conceiving what Jellinek called an ideal type not as a model, but as some-
thing that is perfect in a purely logical sense. Note that the letter in question 
does not even prove that Weber took the word ideal type from Jellinek. In a 
1911 commemorative address, he claimed that he had received “insights of 
immense importance” from Jellinek. However, he did not mention the ideal 
type (Weber 1926: 484).
III.
As far as we can see, research on the conceptual history of the ideal type hasn’t 
gone beyond Jellinek. However, the fact is that this concept occurs in the sci-
ence and philosophy of that time. It appears, for example, in Alois Riegl’s 
lectures “The Origin of Baroque Art in Rome”, held between 1894 and 1902, 
where it is only mentioned: In the middle of the 15th century – before buildings 
with a central layout were understood as an “ideal” – the early Renaissance 
had already discovered that “the hall with one nave would be the ideal type 
of an ecclesiastical longhouse” (Riegl 1908: 111). However, Riegl is not a pos-
sible source for Weber. His lectures were first published in 1908, and Weber 
himself wrote in a letter to Georg Lukács that he had not read Riegl’s work 
before 1913 (Weber 2003a).
The concept of ideal type also occurs in Jonas Cohn’s book General Aesthetics, 
published in 1901, where it is also explained (Cohn 1901: 175-178). Cohn distin-
guished between an “average type” and an “ideal type”. The latter expresses 
“the essence” of something in an “especially pure” manner. The “approxima-
tion of a specimen to this ideal type makes it appear beautiful”. This is because 
“beautiful specimens of something differ from the average by reason of their 
perfectly developed and perfectly proportioned elements and by reason of the 
salient appearence of all the properties which create the beauty of this thing”. 
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Cohn then noted that in most cases the “doctrine of the ideal type” purported 
“more”: namely, that “we perceive in beautiful beings, so to speak, the blue-
print of nature in the most pure manner, whose complete realization otherwise 
is hindered by disturbing conditions”. The “metaphysical foundation” of this 
view is the belief that “the true essence of single things consists in the fact that 
they are instances of general concepts”. It is “the task of each specimen to give 
an expression of such concepts that is as pure as possible”. Cohn rejected this 
“conceptual realism”, but referred to other writings on aesthetics in which the 
view that “beauty can be stated as an approximation to an ideal type” is en-
tangled with “a manifold of other elements”. Cohn’s assertions are interesting, 
because they broach the possibility of a non-metaphysical use of the concept 
of ideal type without combining it – like Rickert – with the conception of a 
model. However, the question of whether Cohn is a source for Weber can-
not be answered with confidence. Weber could have become acquainted with 
Cohn’s book through Rickert. Although Rickert’s discussion of the concept of 
type didn’t mention Cohn, a few pages later in his account of the distinction 
between scientific and aesthetic truth he referred in a footnote to Cohn’s book 
(Rickert 1902: 387). Weber does not mention Cohn before 1913, and says noth-
ing about the concept of ideal type (Weber 2003b; 2003c).
Jellinek’s claim that the concept of ideal type continuously engaged the 
whole scientific thinking since the days of Hellenic philosophy must be regard-
ed as an exaggeration. However, the concept really seemed to be widely held 
in aesthetics since Renaissance. A stock-taking would certainly be beyond the 
scope of this essay. However, we can consider a tradition that comes into ques-
tion as a source, because it represented an attempt to emancipate art from 
metaphysics. For this purpose we can follow Erwin Panofky’s study IDEA.
According to Panofsky, in the Renaissance, Giorgio Vasari prepared the 
ground for the conception that the idea of beauty is not a supernatural a 
priori which, so to speak, resides in the mind of the artist. On the contrary, 
it is produced a posteriori by the artist himself by a synoptic “inner vision” 
that chooses among single cases “the most beautiful things” (Panofsky 1968: 
60-64). Combined with this was the conception that the idea which the artist 
obtained by observation “revealed the actual purposes of nature ‘creating 
according to laws’”. Therefore “’subject’ and ‘object’, mind and nature do not 
stand in hostile or even opposite relation to each other”. On the contrary, “the 
Idea, itself derived from experience, necessarily corresponded to experience” 
(Panofsky 1968: 64). These conceptions lead to a shift in meaning. Now one 
“identified the world of ideas with a world of heightened realities” and the 
“concept of the ‘Idea’ was [...] transformed into the concept of the ‘ideal’ (le 
beau idéal)”: “This stripped the Idea of its metaphysical nobility but at the same 
time brought it into a beautiful and almost organic conformity with nature: 
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an Idea which is produced by the human mind but, far from being subjective 
and arbitrary, at the same time expresses the laws of nature embodied in each 
object [...] by intuitive synthesis” (Panofsky 1968: 65).
Classicism – and especially Giovanni Pietro Bellori with his 1664 essay 
“L’Idea del Pittore, dello Scultore e dell Architetto” – elevated these concep-
tions to a “system”. According to Panofsky, Bellori was convinced that an 
idea has no “metaphysical origin”: “Instead, the artistic Idea itself is said to 
originate from sensory perception, except that in it sensory perception seems 
brought to a purer and higher form” (Panofsky 1968: 106). Bellori conceived 
an idea as “a perfect notion of all things, starting with the observation of na-
ture”, i.e. “the Idea was nothing else than the experience of nature ‘purified’ 
by our mind”, with which “this transformation of the Idea into the beau idéal 
was officially proclaimed” (Panofsky 1968: 106, 108-109). Panofsky addition-
ally emphasizes that Bellori “was not so shortsighted as to claim an absolutely 
universal (i.e., undifferentiatable) validity for the Ideal; rather it is individu-
alized insofar as the ‘Idea’ is a generic notion which – while having general 
validity with its class – lends truly ‘exemplary’ expression to certain types of 
habitual appearence (such as strength, grace, fieriness) as well as to types of 
psychological states (such as anger, grief, or love)” (Panofsky 1968: 244).
Gary Hatfield has shown that this classicist system can be found in the 19th 
century in the work of the physiologist and physicist Hermann Helmholtz, 
especially in his lectures “On the Relation of Optics to Painting” which he 
delivered between 1871 and 1873 in Berlin, Düsseldorf and Cologne (Hatfield 
1993; 1990: 165-234). For Helmholtz, too, the painter has to produce “ide-
alised types” when he “seeks to produce in his picture an image of external 
objects” (Helmholtz 1995a: 281 [1903a: 97-98]). Whereas an uneducated ob-
server requires nothing more than “an illusive resemblance to nature”, an ob-
server whose taste in works of art has been more finely educated will require 
something more than “a faithful copy of crude Nature”:
To satisfy him, he will need artistic selection, grouping, and even idealisation of  
the objects represented. The human figures in a work of  art must not be the eve-
ryday figures, such as we see in photography; they must have expression, and a 
characteristic development, and if  possible beautiful forms, which [...] produce 
a vivid perception of  any particular aspect of  human existence in its complete 
and unhindered development (Helmholtz 1995a: 281 [1903a: 97-98]).
After having discussed the physiological foundations of the perception 
of forms and colours, Helmholtz drew the conclusion that the “sensual dis-
tinctness” of a painting is “by no means a low or subordinate element in the 
action of works of art”; on the contrary it is the very element that first and 
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foremost shows a work of art in the sense of that idealisation the well-educat-
ed observer expects:
What effect is to be produced by a work of  art, using this word in its highest 
sense? It should excite and enchain our attention, arouse in us, in easy play, a 
host of  slumbering conceptions and their corresponding feelings, and direct 
them towards a common object, so as to give a vivid perception of  all the fea-
tures of  an ideal type, whose separate fragments lie scattered in our imagina-
tion and overgrown by the wild chaos of  accident. It seems as if  we can only 
refer the frequent preponderance, in the mind, of  art over reality, to the fact 
that the latter mixes something foreign, disturbing, and even injurious; while 
art can collect all the elements for the desired impression, and allow them to 
act without restraint (Helmholtz 1995a: 307-308 [1903a: 134-135]).
This desired impression will be greater “the deeper, the finer, and the truer 
to nature is the sensuous impression which is to arouse the series of images 
and the effects connected therewith”; it must “act certainly, rapidly, unequiv-
ocably” (Helmholtz 1995a: 308 [1903a: 135]). Thus the peculiarities of the 
painter’s technique, which physiological investigation had shown, are often 
closely connected with the highest problems of art. Helmholtz even thought 
that “the last secret of artistic beauty – that is, the wondrous pleasure which 
we feel in its presence – is essentially based on the feeling of an easy, harmon-
ic, vivid stream of our conceptions, which, in spite of manifold changes, flow 
towards a common object, bring to light laws hitherto concealed, and allow 
us to gaze in the deepest depths of sensation of our own minds” (Helmholtz 
1995a: 308 [1903a: 135]).
Thus Helmholtz provided a scientific basis for the correspondence of sub-
ject and object, mind and nature, which the Renaissance and Classicism had 
claimed. Moreover he perpetuated the epistemological function ascribed to 
art, namely to realize laws of nature through idealisation. It remains to be 
seen whether Vasari, Bellori or other Renaissance and Classicism aesthetes 
could, in the last analysis, emancipate themselves from metaphysics. In any 
case, in Helmholtz’s work are no indications of a conceptual realism, accord-
ing to which the true nature of single things consists in the fact that they are 
instances of general concepts, with each specimen giving an expression of 
this concept as pure as possible. Helmholtz was an outstanding exponent of 
the mechanistic world view (Schiemann 1997). When he spoke of disturbing 
conditions he certainly didn’t mean something which hindered the complete 
realization of a blueprint of nature in the sense of a Platonic idea. On the con-
trary, he meant physical phenomena which can – like the physical phenomena 
they are disturbing – be explained by laws expressed in differential equations; 
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for example, the Kelvin-Helmholtz principle of instability in fluid dynamics 
which Helmholtz discovered at the same time (1868-1873) he delivered his 
lectures on the relation of optics to painting (Helmholtz 1882a; 1882b).
IV.
Like Jellinek, Helmholtz was not a modern logician. However, his work is def-
initely a plausible source for Weber. Just as in his book On the Sensations of Tone 
as a Physiological Basis for the Theory of Music, published in 1863, he applied his 
physiological research to aesthetics in his lectures “On the Relation of Optics 
to Painting”. In his sociology of music, written between 1909 and 1913, Weber 
made full use of the third edition of Helmholtz’s book on the sensations of tone 
(Helmholtz 1870; 1895; Weber 2004). There are no references to Helmholtz’s 
lectures on painting in Weber’s work. However, it is plausible to suppose that 
Weber was acquainted with them.
This supposition is supported by the fact that Helmholtz’s lectures on paint-
ing were published in a new edition of a collection of his popular lectures and 
readings in 1903, i.e. one year before the publication of Weber’s essay “The 
‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy”. In his cri-
tique of Karl Knies, which he wrote at the same time, Weber at least referred 
to two texts included in this collection. In the first part of his critique of Knies, 
published in 1905, he mentioned Helmholtz by his name in order to refer to 
his lecture “On the Relation of Natural Science to Science in General”. In 
addition, it is quite probable that he referred to Helmholtz’s studies “On the 
Conservation of Force” and “Robert Mayer’s Priority”. He returned to these 
studies in “Science as Vocation” where he also referred to Helmholtz’s autobi-
ographical reflections and the quality of his teaching (Weber 2012: 30, 33, 338-
340; 1982: 44, 50, 586; 590; Helmholtz 1995b [1903b]; 1995c [1903c]; 1903d; 
1995d [1903e]). In the second part of his critique of Knies, published in 1906, 
Weber also mentioned Helmholtz by his name referring to his study “On the 
Origin and Significance of Geometrical Axioms” (Weber 2012: 74; 1982: 115-
116; Helmholtz 1995e [1903f]). Although it is possible that Weber used earlier 
editions of these texts, his multifaceted knowledge of Helmholtz’s work suggests 
that he was aquainted with Helmholtz’s lectures on painting, too.
In “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge in Social Science and Social Policy,” 
Weber drew more heavily on concepts employed by natural scientists than the 
secondary literature suggests. In order to explain his understanding of causal-
ity, Weber adopted the theory of objective probability developed by Johannes 
von Kries, a physiologist and student of Helmholtz; once again, Weber didn’t 
mention the author by name (Weber 2012: 118, 126-127; 1949: 80, 92-93; 
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1982: 179, 192-194; Kries 1888; Neumann 2009; Heidelberger 2010). Weber 
was even willing to follow a “leading natural scientist”, in order to base his 
own social science – contra Rickert – on an “astronomical” method of know- 
ledge. This natural scientist was the physiologist Emil Du Bois-Reymond (We-
ber 2012: 114; 1949: 73; 1982: 172; Du Bois-Reymond 1874; Albrecht 2010; 
Wagner and Härpfer 2014). In the light of this consideration, Joachim Rad-
kau’s thesis is quite plausible that Weber, having no equal dialogue partner in 
the natural sciences, had found in the late Helmholtz an “imaginary counter-
part” (Radkau 2005: 627). Hatfield has not only reconstructed Helmholtz’s 
“science of aesthetics” but also his “aesthetics of science”, i.e. “his ‘classicist’ 
aesthetics of scientific explanation” (Hatfield 1993: 524). Thanks to Hatfield’s 
analysis we can concentrate on a few of Helmholtz’s most important positions.
In his critique of Knies, Weber claimed that Helmholtz had distinguished 
the “groups” of the “natural sciences” and the “sciences of the human spirit” 
“according to their object” (Weber 2012: 30; 1982: 44).4 This is true, but only 
half the story. Far from being an adherent of a natural scientific universal 
methodology, Helmholtz argued that different methods arise as a result of 
the differing complexity of objects of investigation. In his address “On the 
Relation of Natural Science to Science in General”, delivered in Heidelberg in 
1862, he designated these methods as “logical induction” and “aesthetic induction” 
(Helmholtz 1995b: 85 [1903b: 171]).5 This difference not only throws light on 
Weber’s discussion of the generalizing mode of concept formation, employed 
by the abstract theory of economics, but also facilitates an understanding of 
his concept of ideal type.
According to Helmholtz, scientific knowledge begins with the discovery 
of laws and causes (Helmholtz 1995b: 83 [1903b: 169]). The first step in the 
“logical” processing of material is “to connect like with like” and “to elabo-
rate a general conception” that “takes a number of single facts together” and 
“stands as their representative in our mind” (Helmholtz 1995b: 83 [1903b: 
169]). When it embraces a number of objects, we call it a “general concep-
tion”, or the “conception of a genus”; when it embraces a series of incidents or 
occurrences, we call it a “law” (Helmholtz 1995b: 83 [1903b: 169]). When we 
“combine the results of experience by a process of thought, and form concep-
tions”, we not only bring our knowledge into a form in which it can be “easily 
used and easily retained”; we also “enlarge” it, inasmuch as we feel ourselves 
4  Mistaken translation: „Geisteswissenschaften“ is translated „sciences of  the human spirit“ 
instead of  „moral sciences“ (Helmholtz 1995b: 79 [1903b: 163]; 1971: 125). Hatfield argues 
that Helmholtz might have appropriated the concept of  „Geisteswissenschaften“ as the German 
translation of  John Stuart Mill’s concept of  „moral sciences“ (Hatfield 1993: 543-544).
5  Hatfield also speaks of  „artistic“ induction (Hatfield 1993: 546).
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entitled “to extend the rules and the laws we have discovered to all similar 
cases that may be hereafter presented to us” (Helmholtz 1995b: 84 [1903b: 
170]). The “law of refraction”, for example, not only embraces “all cases of 
rays falling at all possible angles on a plane surface of water”, but it includes 
“all cases of rays of any colour incident on transparent surfaces of any form 
and any constitution whatsoever”; moreover, it includes not only “the cases 
which we ourselves or other men have already observed”, but we can apply it 
to “new cases, not yet observed, with absolute confidence in the reliability of 
our results” (Helmholtz 1995b: 84 [1903b: 169-170]).
Logical induction causes no difficulties concerning objects and occurrenc-
es for which the like and the unlike can be made out clearly and combined 
into well-defined concepts (Helmholtz 1995b: 84 [1903b: 170]). This is the 
case in physics and physiology. In “complicated” cases, however, difficulties 
occur. Consider a man whom we know as ambitious. We shall perhaps be 
able to predict with tolerable certainty that in his actions he will follow his 
ambition. But we cannot define with absolute precision what constitutes an 
ambitious man, or by what standard the intensity of his ambition is to be 
measured; nor can we say precisely what degree of ambition must operate in 
order to motivate his actions under particular circumstances: “Accordingly, 
we institute comparisons between the actions of the man in question, as far as 
we have hitherto observed them, and those of other men who in similar cases 
have acted as he has done, and we draw our inference respecting his future 
actions without being able to express either the major or the minor premiss in 
a clear, sharply-defined form” (Helmholtz 1995b: 84 [1903b: 170]). Although 
this “intellectual process” is “identical” with that of a logic induction, “our de-
cision proceeds only from a certain psychological instinct, not from conscious 
reasoning” (Helmholtz 1995b: 84 [1903b: 171]).6
According to Helmholtz, this latter kind of induction, which can “never 
be perfectly assimilated to forms of logical reasoning, nor pressed so far as 
to establish universal laws”, plays a most important role in human life. This 
is because the “whole process by which we translate our sensations into per-
ceptions depends upon it,” and it also plays a leading part in “psychological 
processes” (Helmholtz 1995b: 85 [1903b: 171]). Moreover, it is actually em-
ployed in the moral sciences. While the natural sciences are able to perform 
“inductions” up to “sharply-defined general rules and principles”, the moral 
sciences mostly have to do “with conclusions arrived at by psychological in-
stinct” (Helmholtz 1995b: 85 [1903b: 172]). The historical sciences, for exam-
ple, must verify the authenticity of their sources in order to discover the often 
6  The German word „instinct“ is „Tact“ or „Tactgefühl“ (Helmholtz 1903b: 171-172).
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entangled and diverse motifs of individuals and people.7 This is only possible 
by means of psychological instinct: “It is only possible to pass judgment, if you 
have ready in your memory a great number of similar facts, to be instanta-
neously confronted with the question you are trying to solve. [...] Of course 
memory alone is insufficient without a knack of everywhere discovering real 
resemblance” (Helmholtz 1995b: 86 [1903b: 172]).
In contrast to logical induction, which succeeds in building sharply-de-
fined general concepts, Helmholtz called this kind of inference “aesthetic in-
duction”, because “it is most conspicuous in the higher class of works of art” 
(Helmholtz 1995b: 85 [1903b: 171]). According to Helmholtz, it is an essential 
part of an artist’s talent to reproduce by words, by form and colour, or by 
tones the external indications of a character or a state of mind, and by a kind 
of “intuitive intuition” to grasp the necessary steps by which we pass from 
one mood to another: “the works of great artists bring before us characters 
and moods with such a lifelikeness, with such a wealth of individual traits and 
such an overwhelming conviction of truth, that they almost seem to be more 
real than the reality itself, because all disturbing influences are eliminated” 
(Helmholtz 1995b: 85 [1903b: 172]). Along these lines, a decade later, in his 
lectures “On the Relation of Optics to Painting”, Helmholtz speaks of “ideal 
types”. Subsequently he “came to posit the same aesthetic aim for art and for 
science: to find the lawful, to discover the ideal within the variant” (Hatfield 
1993: 557; Helmholtz 1995f [1903g]).
V.
It is well known that Weber followed Rickert’s distinction between natural 
sciences and historical sciences. Nevertheless, he apparently did not regard 
Helmholtz’s distinction between natural sciences and moral sciences as in-
compatible with Rickert’s position. Notwithstanding his emphasis on the 
different epistemological interests of natural sciences and historical sciences, 
Rickert also took note of the objects of investigation. If he emphasized an 
antinomy between the natural sciences and the historical sciences, he simply 
meant that there are two logically different ways to consider reality; either 
with regard to the general, in order to formulate laws, or with regard to the 
particular, in order to conceptualize historical individualities (Rickert 1902: 
28-29, 227-228; 1986: 28, 33-34). However, he stressed that the expression of 
7  This passage (Helmholtz 1903b: 172) has not been translated into English in Helmholtz 
(1995b: 85). It has been translated in Helmholtz (1971: 132).
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this circumstance differs vastly from the reality of academic life. Reality obvi-
ously is not completely indifferent to these two epistemological interests (Rick-
ert 1902: 29). There are objects, such as atoms, that can be investigated only 
by the natural sciences and other objects, such as Goethe or Bismarck, that 
can be investigated only by the historical sciences. Finally, there are things 
accessible to the concepts of both types of science. This is the case with hu-
man society, which can be regarded in a generalizing or in an individualizing 
manner (Rickert 1902: 293-295).
Thus Weber seems to have understood Helmholtz’s distinction as a supple-
ment, useful in as much it provided a differentiation within the generalizing 
conception of reality. Some sciences succeed in formulating sharply defined 
universal laws. Other sciences only arrive at ideal types; because of the com-
plexity of their objects, they cannot perform logical inductions but only aes-
thetic inductions. Weber could place the social sciences in this latter group of 
sciences, since the abstract theory of economics had shown, unwittingly but 
unequivocally, that the generalizing conception of society obviously doesn’t 
get beyond ideal types.8 In any case, Weber didn’t understand the “concept of 
‘laws’” in the “narrowly” defined sense of the natural sciences, but in a “wide-
ly” defined sense that includes “regularities that are not even quantifiable, 
and therefore cannot be expressed numerically” (Weber 2012: 115; 1949: 74; 
1982: 173). Such regularities could be formulated by means of ideal types, and 
either within the scope of a generalizing investigation of reality as the “aim” of 
knowledge or within the scope of an individualizing investigation of reality – 
in which Weber was especially interested in “The ‘Objectivity’ of Knowledge 
in Social Science and Social Policy” – as an “instrument” of knowledge (Weber 
2012: 118; 1949: 80; 1982: 80). The social science Weber wanted to pursue in 
1904 was an individualizing science: “the construction of abstract ideal types 
can only be considered a tool, never an end [in itself ]” (Weber 2012: 126; 
1949: 92; 1982: 193).9
Aesthetic induction was not a fully elaborated method that Weber could 
simply have adopted in order to underpin his conception of social science. Nev-
ertheless, we should not disregard the fact that he followed Classicist aesthetics 
when he introduced his concept of ideal type. His use of an aesthetic metaphor 
is evident. He emphasized that an ideal type is a mental image [Gedankenbild] in 
8  In contrast to Weber, Menger may have understood the concepts of  his theory as “meta-
physical realities” (Rickert 1902: 360). Mäki claims: “while Weber says that the ideal type ‘is a 
conceptual construct [Gedankenbild] which is neither historical reality nor even a »true« reality’, 
we might want to say that, in a sense, Menger’s concepts depicting exact types seek to display 
the ‘true’ reality, namely the universals of  economic life” (Mäki 1997: 483).
9  Mistaken translation: „nicht als Ziel“ [not as an end] is translated „never an end“.
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the sense of an ideal image [Idealbild] in which one conceptualizes the idea of 
a certain part of reality by means of a mental accentuation of one or several 
aspects of similar objects. Moreover, this image is a sketch or drawing [Zeichnung]. 
One has to sketch or draw [zeichnen] it, as Weber himself repeatedly claimed. 
Unfortunately neither English translation captures the metaphorical sense of 
this passage (our emphasis and insertions of zeichnen and Zeichnung in brackets):
To analyse a further example: it is possible, in exactly the same way, to depict 
[zeichnen] the ‘idea’ of  ‘craft’ in [the form of] a utopia, by one-sidedly accentu-
ating the consequences of  certain features that can be found diffusely among 
craftsmen from quite different epochs and countries, combining them into an 
internally consistent ideal image, and relating them to an expression of  ideas 
that seems to manifest itself  in [that ideal image]. One can then further at-
tempt to depict [zeichnen] a society in which all branches of  economic and even 
intellectual activity are governed by maxims that appear to us to be an applica-
tion of  the same principle which characterizes ‘craft’, elevated to the status of  
an ideal type. One can then confront this ideal type of  ‘craft’ with its antithesis: 
the corresponding ideal type of  a capitalist ordering of  industry and trade, ab-
stracted from certain features of  modern large-scale industry; and then go on 
to try to depict [zeichnen] the utopia of  a ‘capitalist’ culture, that is to say, a culture 
dominated solely by the interest in getting a return on [the investment of] pri-
vate capital. [In this utopian ideal type], the distinctive character of  a number 
of  scattered features of  material and non-material cultural life would have to 
be accentuated and combined into an ideal image that we would regard as [in-
ternally] consistent. This would be an attempt to depict [ein Versuch der Zeichnung] 
an ‘idea’ of  capitalist culture (Weber 2012: 125; 1949: 90-91; 1982: 191-192).
It is not a coincidence that in this context Weber repeatedly used the terms 
zeichnen and Zeichnung, even though he rarely uses this metaphor elsewhere.10 
The remainder of Weber’s essay is an attempt to translate this metaphor into 
scientific concepts. In this project, he was unsuccessful. In fact, his summary 
“sample” exhibits an “infinite complexity” that makes even the most modern 
logician shudder (Weber 2012: 133; 1949: 103; 1982: 205).
10  This metaphor appears in Weber’s study “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capital-
ism” which he published at the same time (1904/1905) in the Archive for Social Science and Social 
Policy. In this study the ideal type is characterized as a picture: “The following picture has been 
put together as an ideal type from conditions found in different industrial branches and at dif-
ferent places” (Weber 2005: 149; 1988: 51). Weber also wrote that “the ideal of  the educated 
and highly civilized Puritan woman” is “drawn in Baxter’s funeral oration for Mary Hammer” 
(Weber 2005: 250; 1988: 189).
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VI.
It should be evident that more research is needed to receive at a full under-
standing of Weber’s concept of ideal type. First, an analysis in the history of 
ideas should clarify the contemporary dissemination of this concept, espe-
cially in aesthetics (Glaser 1913: 165; Panofsky 1915: 127-128). Interestingly 
enough, the concept also occured in biometrics which Francis Galton and 
Karl Pearson established in late 19th century (Galton et al. 1901: 1). In ad-
dition, the distinction between logical and aesthetic induction requires in-
vestigation. This includes John Stuart Mill’s influence on Helmholtz as well 
as Helmholtz’s conception of psychological instinct [Tact, Tactgefühl] (Conrat 
1904; Schiemann 1997: 259-264, 423-425; Treiber 2005: 100-101). The im-
portance of these themes is not confined to the history of science. The affinity 
between scientific and artistic knowledge, which Helmholtz had pointed out, 
is obviously of enduring significance. For example, in several contributions to 
Nature, the art historian Martin Kemp has claimed that scientists and artists 
follow the same “structural intuition” (Kemp 2005: 308).
Moreover, complementary methods in the natural sciences must be consid-
ered. This holds especially for experiments and thought experiments as well 
as for models based on abstraction, isolation, and idealization (Hüttemann 
1997; Kühne 2005). The affinity of these procedures to Weber’s ideal type is 
well known (Hempel 1952; Pabjan 2004; Saegesser 1975). Less well known is 
the fact that Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz, a student of Helmholtz, 
used the concept of model and the concept of “mental picture” synonymously 
(D’Agostino 1990; Regt 1999; 2005; Scheibe 2007). It may not be possible to 
establish whether Weber was acquainted with this “Bildtheorie”. Nevertheless, 
it should be clear that his conception of the social sciences cannot be ade-
quately understood without embedding it in a broader context that includes 
the natural sciences as well as aesthetics.
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